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Executive Summary
The implementation of high-speed rail (HSR) technology, at speeds of 80-110 miles per hour (mph), or 129-177 kilometers per hour (km/h), on corridors with pre-existing conventional rail service (up to 80 mph (129 km/h) poses several significant challenges, including extensive employment of at-grade highway-rail crossings. Frequently, these crossings cannot be closed or grade separated, and they are equipped with insufficient warning device technologies to support HSR operations. One solution was four-quadrant gates, with inductive loop vehicle detection, installed at 69 grade crossings on a 121-mile (195 km) segment of the future 280-mile (451 km) HSR corridor between the cities of Chicago and St Louis. This segment, between Mazonia and Springfield in the State of Illinois, will carry passenger trains at speeds up to 110 mph (177 km/h) at many of the highway-rail grade crossings. These and other infrastructure improvements were completed to reduce the Chicago to St. Louis travel time from 5 ½ to 3 ½ hours and increase the number of daily round-trips in each direction from three to five. , conducted a reliability analysis of the four-quadrant gate/vehicle detection equipment based on maintenance records obtained from the Union Pacific Railroad , the owner and operator of the grade crossings. The results of this analysis were used to assess the impact of the equipment reliability on the proposed HSR timetable.
The Volpe Center study showed that the total average delay to the five scheduled daily highspeed passenger round-trips was an estimated 38.5 minutes or approximately four minutes per train. Overall, extensive analysis of the trouble ticket data showed that the four-quadrant gate and vehicle detection equipment had a minimal direct impact on the frequency and duration of grade crossing malfunctions.
Analysis of trouble ticket data can be used to identify recurring maintenance issues that may require further study. This process may eventually lead to optimization of railroad inspection and maintenance procedures, which in the past, railroad inspection and maintenance procedures have been modified to minimize the frequency and impact of malfunction events. Fortunately, longitudinal analysis of maintenance data will facilitate identification of such long-term trends. On the basis of this research, railroad and state engineers will be able to review and, if necessary, modify maintenance procedures to optimize operation of the four-quadrant gate technology.
Introduction
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 designated five future high-speed rail (HSR) corridors (Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), 1997):
The Chicago HSR corridor established a "hub-and-spoke" system centered on Chicago, IL, with termination points in St. Louis, MO, Detroit, MI, and Milwaukee, WI (FRA, 1997) . This effort, part of the broader Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI), will eventually interconnect nine states over a 3,000-mile (4,631 km) system shown in Figure 1 . The overall goal of the MWRRI is to achieve reliable and frequent HSR service with trains operating at speeds between 90-110 mph (145-177 km/h). The features of this service will include new train sets, track infrastructure improvements, four-quadrant gate warning device technology at high-speed highway-rail grade crossings, and railroad signals accommodating the increased speed regimens (Transportation Economics and Management Systems, Inc. et al., 2004) . (FRA, 1994a) . These recommendations, although not required, include the installation of sophisticated traffic control/warning devices such as fourquadrant gates equipped with constant warning time and vehicle detection equipment.
North American Joint Positive Train Control Program
The (FRA, 2007; FRA, 2001) . In addition, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority has aggressively deployed four-quadrant gate technology through its light rail transit (LRT) system.
• 
Report Layout
Section 2 of this report provides an overview of the Illinois HSR corridor and a technical explanation of the four-quadrant gate and vehicle detection systems. Section 3 presents a description of the research methodology and an analysis of the reliability data and Section 4 presents the results of the data analysis and a subsequent discussion. Figure 2 shows the HSR corridor between Chicago and St. Louis. The corridor is owned and operated by the Union Pacific Railroad (UPRR), and contains a mix of freight, intercity conventional passenger rail, and commuter rail service. The majority of the line is single track and at the time the HSR program was initiated, Amtrak operated three daily round-trip passenger trains. In 2006, the frequency was increased to five daily round-trip trains.
Illinois HSR Corridor
The initial goal for the HSR service was eight round trips per day between Chicago and St. Louis, with one-way end-to-end travel time of approximately 3 ½-4 hours. However, lower than expected funding precluded any further infrastructure improvements between Chicago and Dwight, Illinois. Furthermore, fewer high-speed train sets than originally anticipated are being procured. As a result, the level of service is now projected at three round-trips per day, with a one-way trip time of 4-4 ½ hours.
The yellow highlighted portion in Figure 2 , between Springfield and Mazonia, has undergone extensive track rehabilitation, including construction of 12 miles (19 km) of double track and 22 miles (35 km) of freight sidings, and now satisfies FRA Class 6 track regulations for 110 mph (177 km/h) train service.
Figure 2. Illinois HSR Corridor (Tse, 2005)
During the initial environmental impact assessment process, 322 public and private crossings were identified on the corridor of which 11 have since been closed, leaving 311 remaining. In the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS), 68 vehicle and 17 pedestrian crossings were proposed for closure. However, opposition from many impacted communities limited the number of closures proposed in the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) to 10 vehicle and 14 pedestrian crossings. As a result, 174 grade crossings were scheduled to be equipped with upgraded warning devices. This consisted of 118 crossings with four-quadrant gates and vehicle detection as required by Illinois Commerce Commission regulations for train speeds in excess of 79 mph (127 km/h), 51 dual-gate crossings, 4 pedestrian crossings with bells and flashers, and one locked gate at a private crossing . Ultimately, the total number of fourquadrant gate crossings was reduced to the 69 grade crossings between Springfield and Mazonia, including 49 that support HSR operations highlighted in red in Appendix A (Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), FRA, and IDOT, 2003) .
Of the 69 four-quadrant gate crossings, 62 were classified as rural and seven were classified as urban. As depicted in Figure 3 , average annual daily traffic (AADT) at more than two-thirds of the crossings is less than 1,000. 
Four-Quadrant Gate Design
Of the 69 four-quadrant systems installed, 12 were manufactured by Union Switch and Signal and 57 by Western Cullen Hayes. The grade crossing equipment is continually monitored for faults by a solid-state controller. These faults include: crashing of entrance gate arms resulting from a sudden power loss, pumping of gate arms, crashing of counterweights if a gate arm becomes detached, and overloading of motors caused by a stuck gate arm.
The four-quadrant gate crossing system is comprised of the exit gate management system (EGMS), the vehicle detection subsystem, and the gates. The EGMS, manufactured by Railroad Controls Limited, is a microprocessor-based controller that works in tandem with the vehicle detection system to resolve motor vehicle presence within the grade crossing and supply the appropriate gate response. During a train event at the crossing, the EGMS prevents the exit gates from lowering until motor vehicle traffic is no longer detected in the crossing (Railroad Controls Limited, 2004) . If the EGMS detects a compromise in the health of the vehicle detection equipment, it instructs the exit gates to ascend.
The four-quadrant gate equipment was designed for compliance with the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) (MUTCD Chapter 8D, 2003) . Each gate arm is fully reflectorized on both sides with red and white stripes and equipped with three red flashing lights. At grade crossings with two-way highway traffic, back-to-back flashing light signals are installed on each side of the tracks in all four quadrants. On multilane, one-way streets and divided highways, flashing lights are installed on both sides of the road at the entrance to the crossing. When the gates are closed, each gate is required to extend across the entrance and exit gate lanes of road traffic.
The vehicle detection subsystem was designed in accordance with Part 3.1.15 of the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association Communications and Signaling Manual, Recommended Functional/Operating Guidelines for Control of Automatic HighwayRail Grade Crossing Warning Systems (Milewski, 2005) . Each inductive loop consists of a prefabricated shared conduit with a single-turn check loop that runs the entire perimeter of the three-turn primary loop. The detector amplifier periodically shorts the check loop, resulting in a change in inductance, thereby simulating detection of a motor vehicle. If the inductance change is not equal to a predefined reference value, the detector displays a message indicating failure of the loop. Under this scenario, either the EGMS will direct the exit gates to ascend or the crossing will revert to timed operation mode (Reno A and E, undated) .
The vehicle detection technology consists of inductive loops embedded within the roadway, connected to a solid state vehicle detection unit on the wayside. At single track locations, four loops are installed in each approach and exit highway quadrant inside the grade crossing gates. For double-track grade crossing applications, an extra pair of loops is installed between the tracks. These configurations are illustrated in Figure 4 . As described previously, this technology has been successfully implemented on Amtrak's NEC HSR corridor in Connecticut. However, the Illinois configuration is not integrated with the train control system. 
Illinois System Operational Overview
The EGMS operates in two modes with respect to exit gate operation; "dynamic" and "timed." In dynamic mode, which is the primary operational state, exit gate function is dependent on the presence and detection of vehicles within the grade crossing. If no vehicles are detected, the entrance and exit gates descend simultaneously. Timed mode is the EGMS backup operational state. If failure occurs in the EGMS hardware or the vehicle detection subsystem, exit gate descent is delayed until the entrance gates have reached the horizontal position. This operational mode provides an exit means for vehicles within the crossing when the warning system is activated.
The system is designed for fail-safe operation, meaning that the equipment will fail in the most restrictive operational state, so as to minimize the increase in risk. Thus, in either dynamic or timed operational mode, a loss of system power will result in the entrance gates descending and the exit gates ascending. Like the previous description of timed mode, this condition provides a path for vehicles within the crossing to exit if power fails. Because the entrance gates remain lowered, the railroad civil speed limit at the crossing is reduced to 15 mph (24 km/h).
The basis for the high-speed capability of the four-quadrant gate crossings is the advanced activation function in which an approaching PTC-equipped train interrogates the health status of the grade crossing using a radio-based communication link. This function is an overlay to the underlying conventional track circuit crossing activation circuitry. However, advanced activation provides vital support to high-speed operations at the four-quadrant gate crossings in two key respects; 1) a constant warning time for train time to arrival and 2) a safe distance for responding to speed restrictions if the crossing health status is compromised.
Each PTC-equipped locomotive contains an onboard computer with a database of equipped crossings, including location, track circuit configuration, conventional approach speeds, and warning times. As the locomotive approaches a grade crossing, the locomotive computer initiates an advanced activation session with the PTC equipment at the grade crossing. Once the advanced activation session is established, the locomotive computer transmits the estimated train arrival time to the crossing based on its predicted speed, current locomotive control settings, and train and track characteristics. The grade crossing equipment processes the information and transmits a response to the locomotive that includes the operational status of the advanced activation function and the total time the crossing has been activated (ARINC and CANAC, 2000) . If the crossing equipment is either inoperative or the equipment status cannot be established, the PTC system will generate a speed restriction equal to the track circuit configuration of the crossing, typically 79 mph (127 km/h) (Weber, G., personal communication, May 29, 2007). 
Vehicle Detection System Operational Sequence
The four-quadrant gate crossings are designed for a 30-second minimum warning time for passenger and freight trains operating at 79 mph (127 km/h) and 60 mph (97 km/h), respectively.
When a grade crossing is activated, the gate warning lights flash for 5 seconds. In dynamic mode operation, if no motor vehicles are detected and the crossing equipment is operating normally, both the entrance and exit gates will descend in tandem. All four gates will arrive at the horizontal position within 10 seconds of beginning descent and remain there for a minimum of 15 seconds before train arrival. This sequence is depicted in Figure 5 . During this time, if a vehicle is detected within the crossing, the exit gates will cease lowering and begin to ascend. Once the detection system verifies the crossing is unoccupied, the exit gates will resume descending. When all of the gates reach the horizontal position and the grade crossing island circuit is activated by a train, the vehicle detection system is inhibited. This prevents the train from being incorrectly detected as a highway vehicle, which would result in the inadvertent raising of the exit gates by the EGMS. Once the rear end of the train clears the island circuit, the gates begin to ascend and return to the vertical position within 12 seconds.
Any malfunction of the EGMS, crossing gates, or the vehicle detection system, will result in the four-quadrant gate system automatically defaulting to timed mode operation. In this scenario, the exit gates do not initiate descent until the entrance gates are in the horizontal position, thereby allowing motor vehicles to clear the crossing. Additionally, all the gates are required to be in the horizontal position a minimum of 5 seconds before the arrival of a train at the crossing.
Under certain conditions, speed restrictions are issued to the locomotive as it approaches a fourquadrant gate grade crossing. The first case involves either a non-PTC-equipped locomotive or faulty advanced activation functionality at a crossing. In response, the PTC system will revert to the underlying track circuit signaling system and the corresponding maximum track speeds. On the IDOT HSR corridor, these speeds are typically 79 mph (127 km/h) and 60 mph (97 km/h) for passenger and freight operations, respectively. The second scenario is a consequence of the crossing equipment being activated more than 2 minutes. If the activation time falls between 2 and 5 minutes, the existing track circuit speed limit is enforced. In situations involving the equipment being activated greater than 5 minutes, a locomotive speed restriction of 15 mph (24 km/h) is generated.
When a crossing alarm is activated, a trouble ticket is automatically issued and a maintainer is dispatched to the crossing. Once the issue is resolved, the maintainer updates and closes out the trouble ticket. These records are stored electronically by the UPRR at its central office in Omaha, Nebraska. A sample trouble ticket is shown in Appendix B. 
CROSSING

Research Methodology
The evaluation process consisted of 1) identifying and characterizing the malfunction types, 2) calculating the probability of occurrence and mean time to repair (MTTR) for each malfunction type, and 3) estimating the resulting cumulative delay on the proposed HSR timetable.
In April 2005, FRA sent a formal request to UPRR requesting trouble ticket reports for fourquadrant gate vehicle detection technology installed on the Illinois HSR corridor (see Appendix C). In May 2005, the UPRR forwarded trouble tickets pertaining to the exit gates, EGMS, and the vehicle traffic detection loops for the period from May 9, 2003 , and May 3, 2005 , (Breeden, personal communication, May 13, 2005 (Breeden, personal communication, February 23, 2006) . These two sets were evaluated by the Volpe Center for trends in malfunction occurrences and maintenance downtimes that may impact the future HSR timetable. The second set was employed as part of a "before and after" case of the original dual-gate technology on the HSR corridor with the four-quadrant gate and vehicle detection systems. Both datasets were used to characterize the impact from grade crossing equipment malfunction on the future HSR timetable from the types and frequencies of grade crossing equipment malfunctions.
Evaluation Assumptions
• A constant train velocity of 110 mph (177 km/h) was assumed for the entire corridor.
• The anticipated number of daily round-trip HSR trains ranges from 6 to 16, depending on the available level of funding support for the service.
• The high-speed alternative, the most ambitious approach, has a one-way trip travel time of 3.5 hours and a 110 mph (177 km/h) maximum train velocity on most of the corridor with 125 mph (202 km/h) on an 18-mile (29 km) stretch between Lincoln and Springfield, Illinois. The preferred alternative has a one-way trip travel time of 4 to 4.5 hours, subject to the extent of the infrastructure upgrades. The maximum train velocity under this option is 79 mph (127 km/h) between Chicago and Dwight and 110 mph (177 km/h) between Dwight and St. Louis. The values employed in this analysis, 10 round-trip trains per day and a one-way travel time of 3 hours and 50 minutes, fall between these two estimates. The high-speed timetable shown in Table 3 reflects these assumptions. 
Analysis of Entrance and Exit Gate Data
Data Set I refers to the 93 trouble ticket records for the time period from May 9, 2003 , to May 3, 2005 . This data set, collected over 726 days, reflects 14 different malfunction types, as shown by the Pareto distribution in Figure 6 . Analysis of the data showed that four malfunction types contributed to 75 percent of the total number of trouble tickets, and the remaining 10 types were responsible for the other 25 percent. 
Malfunction Types
Percent of Total
Figure 6. Pareto Distribution of Malfunctions from Data Set I by Reported Cause
The 14 malfunction types were reclassified into the nine categories related to grade crossing equipment reliability shown in Table 4 . As shown in the Figure 7 pie chart, four malfunction types, totaling 28 percent of the trouble tickets-EGMS, loop detector, loop sensor, and exit gate activation-were specific to exit gate equipment. Exit gate activation issues, mostly arising from oversensitive loop sensors and detectors, accounted for 22 percent of the trouble ticket reports. This condition was typically resolved by decreasing detector sensitivity, but maintaining it above the motor vehicle detection threshold. The weighted probabilities of occurrence and MTTR for each malfunction type were used to calculate the impact of the four-quadrant gate/vehicle detection system on the proposed HSR timetable. Further analysis of the MTTR data revealed a significant time-based component with several orders of magnitude between the highest and lowest values. This is more typical of a log-normal distribution rather than a normally distributed, symmetric distribution. For this type of application, the geometric mean, which is related to the log-normal distribution, provides a more realistic depiction for averaging data.
Theoretical Analysis of Average Time to Fix
For normally distributed, symmetric data, the arithmetic mean would typically be used. However, analysis of the MTTR data revealed a significant time-based component with several orders of magnitude between the highest and lowest values. Also, the data sets are positively skewed and bounded by zero. These characteristics are associated with a log-normal distribution rather than a normally distributed, symmetric distribution.
For this type of application, the geometric mean, which is related to the log-normal distribution, provides a more realistic average time to fix estimate. Figure 9 shows an example of a lognormal distribution compared to a normal distribution how the data distributions for the No Cause Found type responded to the geometric mean.
Theoretical Analysis
Consider a set of positive data containing n elements, [ ] 
, and the average weighted daily delay (AWDD) resulting from a malfunction type is
where the number of affected trains per day is E N the total schedule delay from a malfunction, assuming it has occurred is E N s ⋅ 110 (9).
In calculating E N , the following assumptions were used:
• The geometric MTTR of each malfunction type equals the average time a malfunction will affect the HSR timetable, • The proposed Chicago-St. Louis HSR trip time is 3 hr 50 min, • The end-to-end trip time implies an average train speed of 73.2 mph, and • 10 trains will operate daily between Chicago and St. Louis daily (5 round-trips).
Similarly, several assumptions were used in the total schedule delay,
• Under worst-case conditions, the maximum allowable train speed at a malfunctioning grade crossing is 15 mph (24 km/h), • The train deceleration and acceleration rate is 1 mph/s (0.621 km/s), • Train length is 500 ft (151 m), including the locomotive, and • A typical crossing is 150 ft (45 m) in length.
Under these assumptions, a train will require 95 seconds to decelerate from 110 mph (177 km/h) to 15 mph (24 km/h), while covering a distance of 8,650 ft (2,621 m). At 15 mph (24 km/h), the train will require 30 seconds to traverse the crossing and clear the island circuit. The process is then repeated as the train accelerates back to 110 mph (177 km/h), for a total time of 220 seconds (Meyer 2001) . This speed profile is illustrated in Figure 10 . Conversely, a train that is not required to reduce speed will traverse the entire 17,950 ft (5,440 m) in approximately 110 seconds. The difference between the two times, 110 seconds, is the delay a train will incur due to a single malfunctioning crossing. N for each malfunction type was resolved manually by scanning the proposed HSR timetable for the interval, equal to the MTTR, in which the maximum number of trains will be present on the corridor. Because not all trains on the corridor will be affected by an individual malfunction, an approach was developed to estimate the number of trains that will experience a delay. The arrival times for each train at the four-quadrant gate crossings, shown in Appendix D, were estimated using the proposed 3 hr 50 min schedule.
For example, the MTTR for the "no cause found" malfunction type was calculated as 2 hours 11 minutes, which was rounded down to 2 hours. The maximum number of trains on the corridor for any two hour time period is five. Because the first 64 and last 106 miles (171 km) of the corridor are not in high-speed territory, only three of the five trains were found to be affected by the "no cause found" malfunction type during the 2-hour time intervals.
Results and Discussion
In this analysis, 889 unique malfunction tickets were recorded over 677 days, resulting in an average of 1.31 malfunctions per day. The probability of each malfunction type, ranging from , was calculated by applying the above delay equations to the data in Appendix E. Additionally, the total average daily delay was 10 minutes and 38 seconds, equivalent to an average of about one minute per train. Thus, on average, the impact from the malfunction codes on the HSR timetable was minimal.
The second and third columns of Table 5 show the malfunction types ranked by event frequency and probability of occurrence, unadjusted for MTTR or duration. Two types, no cause found and other were typically entered by the grade crossing maintainer when a malfunction was reported or an alarm was recorded but could not be duplicated. In many cases, the trouble tickets were related to the exit gate equipment, including improper lowering of one or more exit gates, and wind issues. Although no cause found and other were not conclusive indicators of delay to the HSR timetable, they could not be eliminated as potential predictors of future crossing equipment induced delays.
The geometric averaged weighted daily delay for each malfunction type is shown in the fourth column of Table 5 . These values were calculated from the product of the event probability, the number of trains affected per day assuming a 10-train schedule, and the worst-case delay experienced by a single train from a malfunction (110 seconds). This calculation yielded a probabilistic estimate of the contribution from each malfunction to the average of 1.31 malfunctions/ day. These values, including the total average weighted delay for the entire set of malfunction types, are found in the fourth column of Table 5 . The sum of the seven malfunction types responsible for approximately 80 percent of the trouble tickets contributed over 8 minutes to the total 10.5 minutes of average weighted daily delay. Assuming a 10-train daily schedule, this equates roughly to an average of one minute per train.
The last column in Table 5 is an estimate of the HSR timetable delay attributed to each malfunction event, assuming 100 percent probability of occurrence. These results typify the expected delay until a malfunction event has been resolved. Of importance is the marked difference from the average weighted delay values. More significantly, these results show that the average weighted delay, which is directly related to event probability, may not necessarily be the best measure of the impact from a malfunction. A new metric for characterizing the impact, delay index (DI), is presented in column 5. This is a measure of the delay incurred on the HSR timetable resulting from a particular malfunction type and is analogous to the expression for risk in safety-related research. DI is expressed as the product of the event probability, f P , and the average weighted daily delay (eq. 8) resulting from each malfunction type. The formula,
is akin to the expression for risk in safety-related research, where AWWD is the severity term. Delay is often used as an alternative metric for risk. However, in this study, the delay index was employed as a means to measure the delay impact for a grade crossing malfunction, so as to maintain the distinction with the traditional definition of risk. As shown in fifth column of Table  5 , the average delay term weighs the DI ranking such that the electronics failure and sand, rust, or other deposit on rail terms have a stronger impact on timetable delay than as a function of event frequency or probability only. An alternative approach to ranking the impact of malfunctions is presented in Table 6 with DI now expressed as a function of MTTR. Although not a direct measure of delay to the HSR timetable, MTTR is a strong predictor. Here, the delay index is expressed as
, where MTTR is the severity term. Under this scenario, lower probability events with large MTTR values may generate a significantly higher DI rank than frequently occurring events. These low probability events may also occur concurrently at multiple grade crossings, potentially resulting in an amplification of the impact on the HSR timetable.
Consider the case of sand, rust, or other deposit on rail, with a DI MTTR of 896. This malfunction type could potentially result in loss of shunt and, under worst-case conditions, yield a significant delay. Factors such as the number of impacted crossings and the repair time are highly variable and could cause the effect on the HSR timetable to vary significantly. Although the f P for this malfunction type (5.40 Table 7 A total of seven malfunction types, resulting in 31 trouble tickets, were issued at 29 different grade crossings during the 24-hour period in which the storm impacted Central Illinois. The MTTR for these events was approximately 23 hours. For the proposed HSR timetable, an estimated 10 trains would be delayed, with a single train potentially experiencing a delay of almost 53 minutes. However, numerous delays occurred during the day of the storm that impacted the Amtrak timetable.
illustrates the occurrence of malfunction events from November [24] [25] 2004 . The second column shows that two malfunction types, AC power failure and gate mechanical failure, contributed to 23 of the 31 trouble tickets. This was equivalent to almost 75 percent of the total trouble tickets issued. As shown in the third column of Table 7 , the incidence of these two malfunction types during the snow and ice storm was disproportionate to their overall weight in the general population of Data Set II. The most plausible explanation for this discrepancy is that these malfunction events were a direct result of the snow and ice storm, especially in light of the trouble ticket descriptors supplied by the railroad signal maintainers. The descriptors included commercial power failure, snow on the island circuit, ice and snow on gate arms, and high winds preventing the exit gates from ascending. The Illinois implementation, featuring 69 four-quadrant gate/vehicle detection systems over a span of 60 miles (97 km), represents the largest installation of this technology to date on a HSR system. The purpose of this research was to evaluate the timetable impact, if any, from the reliability of the 69 four-quadrant gate/vehicle detection systems installed on the future Illinois HSR corridor. Since a HSR timetable was not in existence, the authors constructed a representative "best-guess" estimate that is a synthesis of likely one-way trip timetables and daily round-trip frequencies published in the public domain.
Equipment reliability was determined using a probabilistic model developed by applying statistical analysis to identify trends in grade crossing equipment trouble tickets. The 38 malfunction types were sorted by type, frequency (which was used to derive probability), and resolution time (which was used to calculate MTTR). The weighted probabilities of occurrence and MTTR for each malfunction type were used to calculate the impact of the four-quadrant gate/vehicle detection system on the proposed high-speed timetable.
The total average daily delay is 10 minutes and 38 seconds, equivalent to an estimated average of one minute per train for a 10-train daily schedule. As such, the reliability of the four-quadrant gate/vehicle detection system will incur minimal impact on the HSR timetable. However, some interesting insights resulted from this research. First, the majority of trouble tickets were related to the maintenance of railroad signaling system components that are interconnected with the grade crossing electronics and not an indication of the four-quadrant gate/vehicle detection system reliability. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of crossing malfunctions equally impacted operations of both the entrance and exit gate equipment. However, the malfunction or improper operation of a small subset of components was predicted to result in potentially prolonged disruptions to passenger rail operations. These low probability events may occur concurrently at multiple grade crossings, potentially resulting in an amplification of the impact on the HSR timetable.
Second, analysis of trouble ticket data can be used to identify recurring maintenance issues that may require further study. This may eventually lead to optimization of railroad inspection and maintenance procedures. Railroad inspection and maintenance procedures have been modified to minimize the frequency and impact of these events. Fortunately, longitudinal analysis of maintenance data will facilitate identification of such long-term trends. On the basis of this research, railroad and state engineers will be able to review and, if necessary, modify maintenance procedures to optimize operation of the four-quadrant gate technology. 
